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February, 1933 Circular No. 146 
The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa 
VIII. How Tariffs Affect Farm Prices 
By THEODORE W. SCHULTZ 
AGRfCULTURAL EXPERI.MENT STATTON 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND 
MECHANIC ARTS 
R. ){. HUOHM, Aetinit l>inctor 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOlllCS SECTlOS 
AllES, IOWA 
FOREWORD 
The World War and subsequent events changed the 
United States from the world's greatest debtor to that of 
the second greatest creditor. Our country is today a ma-
ture creditor country. This is a new experience for us. As 
a nation we are still debtor-minded. We think and act like 
debtors; our policies are those that suited the pre-war 
period. 
This change in our international financial position vitally 
affects the export farmer. His very existence is at stake. 
Table III, which gives the change in our debtor-creditor · 
position, demands serious study. The story it tells is so 
important to the 'vell-being of Iowa. farm people that it 
would be well if this table were framed and hung in every 
farm home in the state. We might then ponder more seri-
ously the consequences of this changed state of affairs. 
This publication is the eighth in the series on the "Agri-
cultural Emergency in Iowa.'' The other circulars dealt 
with the general existing situation, the causes of the present 
emergency, the voluntary domestic allotment plan, the Iowa 
farm ·mortgage situation, control of the general price level, 
an analysis for farmers of the Iowa tax situation and mone-
. tary inflation. These will be sent by the Bulletin Office, 
Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, upon request. 
The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa 
VIII. How Tariffs Affect Farm Prices 
B7 THEODOR& W, SCHULTZ 
THE NATURE OF TARIFFS 
A tariff is a tax collected on a commodity as it crosses a national 
boundary. The payment is made to the State by the person who 
brings the commodity in. 
The term "tariff" was first used to refer to a table that listed 
those articles, with their corresponding taxes, that were not 
permitted free entrance. At present these tables are usually 
called schedules. They are extremely complicated affairs. The 
Tari1f Act of 1930, for instance, is a document of 283 pages. In 
it the dutiable commodities are divided into 16 schedules with 
a total of 1,814 paragraphs, many of which in turn list duties on 
a large number of articles. In addition to the dutiable list there 
are 353 sections, nearly 100 pages, of special provisions. 
Tari1f systems are based upon either ad valorem or specific 
duties, or upon a combination of the two. Ad valorem duties are 
usually a fixed percentage of the value of the goods and when the 
value changes, the duty also changes. Specific duties are based 
upon a unit of weight, measure, or count-60 many cents a pound, 
so many cents a dozen, or so many dollars a ton, and so on. Spe-
cific duties are much simpler to administer than are ad valorem 
duties. 
PURPOSE OF TARIFFS 
Tariffs like other taxes have two main purposes, (1) to raise 
revenue, and (2) to discourage the activity that is being taxed. 
In the modern State the chief purpose of taxes, other than tariffs, 
is to raise revenue while tariffs are used largely to cheek imports. 
Before the war all countries raised most of their revenues with 
tariffs. At the present time most ad\'anced countries depend 
largely upon income taxes . 
. The revenue aspect of tariffs is today of secondary importance; 
their protective features are being increasingly stressed. Bu~ 
even so, a substantial part of the revenue of our federal budget 
is raiRed by tariffs. They contributed an average of $548,000,000 
yearly to the receipts of our federal government from 1927 to 
1931, which was 14 percent of the total. Before the war, how-
ever, they provided over half the national revenue. "Free-trade" 
Great Britain, in 1930, raised $588,000,000, or 15 percent of her 
budget, by tariffs. 
The United States has no strictly revenue tariffs. The duties 
that are enforced were enacted to protect domestic producers. 
They were not planned primarily for their revenue-raising abil-
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ity. Obviously, a duty that keeps foreign produce from coming 
in fails as a revenue measure. Duties on tea and coffee, since 
they cannot be produced here, would be examples of revenue 
tariffs. Since domestic tomatoes do not ripen during the winter 
months, unless grown in hothouses, the duty of 3 cents a pound 
on them is, in effect, a revenue measure during December and 
January. The tariff on sugar produces one-fourth of our cus-
toms receipts. But, to make the tariff, for instance on sugar, a 
·purely revenue duty, it would be necessary to levy an equiva-
lent excise tax on all domestic production. This would cancel iti.i 
protective feature. 
But why should a country discourage importsf No person 
thinks of making everything for himself. Are there some special 
reasons why a nation should do so f Before taking up the spe-
cific arguments for tariffs and the protection that they afford, it 
is necessary to understand some . first principles that underly 
all trade. 
In simplest terms international trade rests upon two funda-
mental propositions: (1) The law of comparative -advantages, 
which determines the kind and quantity of goods and services 
exchanged, and (2) the fact that imports pay for exports. Both 
of these will be examined in turn, after which their bearing on 
tariffs will be considered. 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES 
Why do men trade f The answer is that men trade to gain 
the advantages of specialization. Every man has a variety of 
needs. He wants food, shelter, clothing and recreation. He 
could provide himself all of these by being a farmer, carpenter, 
tailor and actor in turn. But experience teaches that it pays 
each man to spend his time in doing that which he can do best. 
By specialization and exchange, with the farmer growing corn 
and feeding hogs and the carpenter building homes, both are 
enriched. 
The simplest form of trade is the exchange of goods and serv· 
ices produced in the same locality. 
Most trade, however, involves the exchange of goods between 
different localities. This is called regional specialization and it 
has economic advantages as clearly as individual specialization; 
Just as some persons are better fitted to do certain things, so some 
localities, because of soil, climate or nearness to power, raw mate-
rial and markets are especially adapted to produce certain goods. 
No one questions whether or not farmers of Iowa are better sit-
uated to grow corn than those in North Dakota and Mississippi 
or that North Dakota excels in wheat and Mississippi in cotton. 
Climate, topography and soil cause the farmers of New York, 
Wisconsin and Minnesota to specialize in dairying. Since New 
York is near to large cities it produces mostly fluid milk; Wis-
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consin and Minnesota, being more remote from large markets, 
find it advantageous to use much of their milk. to make butter 
and cheese. 
Our oranges, grapefruit and lemons come from California, 
Florida and Texas; our iron ore is taken mostly from upper Min-
nesota. We associate automobiles with Detroit, tires with Akron, 
steel with Pittsburgh and motion pictures with Hollywood. 
Gain from International Trade 
But regional specialization does not stop at national bound-
aries. Nor are the gains less when the exchange involves inter-
national trade. · 
Brazil is especially well suited to grow coffee. Cuba, with her 
rich soil and favorable climate, can produce cane sugar more 
cheaply than the United States. India and Java excel in tea, 
Japan and China in silk, and Malaya in rubber. But these c9un-
tries are not favorably located to grow corn, cotton and wheat. 
Trading their coffee, sugar, tea and silk for our pork and lard, 
cotton textiles and flour is as clear a gain as the regional exchange 
of goods within a country. 
It would be absurd for the United States to use her resources 
to grow, for example, bananas. Likewise, for Jamaica, Costa 
Rica, Honduras and Panama to shift from tropical fruits to 
wheat production would be equally foolhardy. Trade between 
the United States and these Central American countries makes it 
possible for each to continue to produce that for which it is best 
adapted, and as a result all enjoy a greater variety and abund-
ance of goods. 
With unrestricted trade among nations different parts of the 
earth's surface are put to those uses for which they are best 
suited. 
But the benefits of international trade are not limited to agri-
culture where climate, soil and topography are all important. 
Similar advantages are found in the exchange of manufactured 
goods. 
The United States can make many mass-produced industrial 
products for the rest of the world more cheaply than they can 
produce them for themselves. The large scale production meth-
ods used in making automobiles, tires, typewriters, sewing ma-
chines, safety razors and similar goods, give our manufacturers 
a distinct advantage in their production. On the other hand, 
Europe can produce handicraft articles much more cheaply than 
we can. The skill and time that are needed to make fine lace, 
fancy embroidery, toys, artistic pottery, silverware, hand deco-
rated leather articles, optical instruments and numerous other 
specialties, are not ours. 
In the aggregate the people of the United States are richer by 
trading agricultural staples and certain mass-produced manu-
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factured goods for the handmade articles of Europe. We gain 
by getting a thousand and one specialties which, because of the 
amount of labor and skill they require, we cannot afford to make 
for ourselves. They in turn benefit by paying less for their 
bread and meat and automobiles than it costs to produce them in 
Europe. 
It is important not to conclude from the preceding argument 
that trade between individuals, regions and countries is profit-
able only when a commodity can be made more cheaply by one 
than by the other. Trade involves many commodities and the 
gains of specialization and exchange depend not upon absolute, 
but upon relative advantages and disadvantages. 
A good doctor may be able to operate a typewriter_better than 
his typist. But it will nevertheless pay him to specialize in medi-
cine and to hire the stenographic help he needs. Take another 
illustration. The same field in a farm may be best both for grow-
ing corn and for the site of farm buildings, but obviously it can-
not be used for both. All things must be considered together. 
It is the relative, and not the absolute difference in advantages 
that is important. Even though the United States were superior 
in every field of production, trade between it and other countries 
still would be profitable. A country gains most when it special-
izes in those things in which its comparative advantage is 
greatest. 
The rise and expansion of foreign trade among western coun-
tries is closely related to their advance to higher standards of 
living. International specialization is ~he very foundation of 
the consuming habits to which we have become accustomed. Each 
day sees us draw upon the skill and resources of men and lands 
of many countries. 
Tariffs are the principal means by which specialization among 
nations is restricted. Tariffs not only stop regional division of 
labor but also limit the size of business enterprise, the use of 
machinery and the specialization of labor. Large plants require 
large markets. In this the producers, especially manufacturers, 
of the United States have had a distinct advantage over Euro-
pean producers.- In spite of tariffs the United States is a large 
market. One can travel east and west four days and north and 
south two days without crossing a tariff barrier. In contrast, 
Europe with nearly the same area, is divided into 27 areas each 
isolated from the other by tariff walls. A General Motors or 
U. S. Steel corporation would be as great a misfit in any one of 
the 27 ''walled in'' areas of Europe as a 70-ton dinosaur in an 
Iowa cornfield. 
Note, however, that the corn-hog farmer is an international 
specialist; he is even larger than U. S. Steel; the United States 
is too small a market for his lard; he is today dependent upon a 
world market'. Can he continue to specialize in com and hogs 
in view of the present international warfare in tariffs 7 
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IMPORTS PAY FOR EXPORTS 
The second basic principle that runs through all international 
trade is that over a period of years imports pay for exports. The 
international accounts of a nation must balance. Commodities 
and services bought from foreigners pay for those sold to them 
and vice versa. If one is stopped sooner or later the other also 
disappears. 
The international cash book of a country is known as the bal-
ance of international payments. In it all the transactions with 
other countries appear, and credits equal debits. It is not unlike 
the balance sheet which an individual uses when he studies his 
income and outgo. 
Nor are the essential principles underlying the international 
balance of payments dift'erent from those that apply to the trans-
actions of an individual. When a farmer buys a plow he pays 
for it in one of three ways; with cash, with credit, or with com-
modities that he produces. But for him to use either cash or 
credit to pay for all purchases over a period of years is impos-
sible. A farmer's cash and credit would soon be exhausted. In 
the end he must pay for the goods he buys with the goods he sells. 
His incoming payments must balance his out.going. And it fol· 
lows that the less he sells the less he can buy. This is all too 
drastically evident today with 10 cent corn and $2.50 hogs. 
In these particulars the international payments of a country 
are like those of an individual. The items that appear in the bal-
ance sheet of a nation are, of course, more complex and intricate 
and yet the important features are the same. For instance, 
when Germans buy cotton, wheat and lard they can pay with 
gold-since no other money is acceptable among nations-with 
funds borrowed from abroad, or with goods. But they too, in the 
end, must exchange goods for goods or stop buying. 
The total available monetary gold in the world is only about 
12 billion dollars and two-fifths of this has now been for 
years in the United States. The total gold holdings of all of the 
countries outside of the United States would have paid for a 
little over one-half of the gross payments due our citizens for 
goods and services sold abroad in the one year, 1928. Obviously 
international credit also is limited. The only way, then, in which 
exporters can receive pay for their wares over a period of years 
is through imports. It is important to keep in mind that in the 
last analysis international trade is essentially barter. 
The following section shows what is meant by the phrase "bal-
ance of payments.'' Since it is best illustrated by example, let 
us consider the relevant figures for this country for 1928. The 
year 1928 is taken because the payments are fairly typical of the 
post-war period. 
The balances compiled by Ray Hall of the Department of 
Commerce are given in tables I and II. Although these estimates 
are admittedly subject to considerable error, they are the best 
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available. All items in columns 3 and 4 in the following table are 
net-incoming payments in every case have been · canceled 
against corresponding outgoing payments. Observe that there-
fore each item appears but once, either as a credit or as a debit. 
The Balances 
Table I summarizes the financial transactions of all interna-
tional activity in which Americans had part during 1928. The 
incoming and outgoing payments are the pans of the balance. 
The weights that tip it in favor of this country are called credit 
items and those that act in the opposite direction are debits. 
The total value of all the weights in the two pans measures the 
"international turnover" between the United States and all 
other countries. 
The incoming and outgoing payments appearing in table I 
give the gigantic total of 20,994 million dollars. The tremendous 
role that international transactions have in the business activity 
of the Untied States is self-evident. By 1931, however, our in-
ternational turnover had declined to 13,000 million dollars, and 
it is estimated that in 1932 it again was sharply lower. 
TABLE I. ESTIMATED BALANOE OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1928~ GIVING ALL INCOMING 
PAYMENTS TO TlIE UNITED STATES AND ALL OUTGOING PAYMENTS 
FROM: THE UNITED STATES TO OTHER OOUNTRIES. 
(llllllon• of Dollan) 
Balance 
11,333 865 
2,795 
sge 1137 
1113 
207 207 
4450 
~ ....,._.. t. , .. tlalletl Stala (Ctt.lib) 
EzpcrU (all eommodilifll) ................................ . 
Capital linPorta (ratti&n ln'n!llmeDta here) ................. .. 
Eamlnp on hmstmtnta abroed ••.••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Towiltupenditan.of ~ here ..................... . 
War debt fteeipta (not) .................................. . 
M~inmbleli-.............................. . 
629 212 
14 14 
Gold ................................................... . 
Error .................................................. . 
i-------b------1-----
Total ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
~ r.,-.11 hom IM Ualled Staf .. {DeWfa) 
Importa (all eommoditiel) ............................... .. 
C.pilal esporta (ntW lnTfttmenta am.d. tie.) .............. . 
};arnhl& to rcnigmn on bm9tmtnta ill America ••••••••••••• 
Towilt upenditam of~ at:n.d ••••••••••••••••••• 
lmmiirmi& remillancls (net) .............................. . 
M"llCellntoul imillble Ii-............................. .. 
Short lerm credit to foreipen ........................... .. 
Gold ................................................... . 
10,497 
4,468 
a,1113 
~g 
824 
218 
m 
228 
~7 
1,ns 
718 
Ml 
218 
72 
220 
r-------r~--~·b---~-
Total .......................................... ;.. 10,497 J,895 
Gruel total (aD ltema).............................. 20, 99i 
Soarce: Bued on the excellent work done b7 Ray Ban; formerly a11l1tan& chief of 
the Finance and IDYedment DMalon. United States »7artment of Commerce, 
as reported In Blllane• of lnlernaflOMl P111111tmt. o lh• UnUed Slalu fn 
J981. Trade Information Bulletin No. 808, pp. '16-77. 
Commodity 
••porta 
Capitol 
lmporta 
Gold 
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10 
q 
,. 
t-+-~~~-· ...... ~~~--1-t 
"' ..
.. 
t--+-~~~-o ....... ~~~-+--ll"""""' 
0 
.. 
0 
,. 
2 
0 
s 
:; 3 ~h'~A-__,r-t~~~~ ........ ~~-+1----liVhi'h 
INC.OMUIG NET 
PAVMf.ln'$ Cl.tom 
feo111111odlt .. 
u .. por&s 
{C.opltol 
c.aPorh 
Fie. 1. Balance of fnterna\loul pa:rmmta of the United States fDr 11128. (Dutil 
OD cable I.) 
Trade 
The largest and most important items on the international 
cash book are exports and imports of commodities. Our prin-
cipal exports include lard, cotton and tobacco; wheat, rye and 
barley; apples and oranges; salmon and sardines; automobile 
tires, cigarettes and hosiery; gasoline and kerosene; tin plates, 
copper, lumber, rosin and turpentine; locomotives, sewing ma-
chines, cash registers, typewriters and printing machinery; auto-
mobiles, motorcycles and pianos. These give rise to incoming 
paThyme~ts. rta t odit' · · rt list' 'lk e unpo n comm 1es m our unpo _ are raw 81 , 
rubber, paper and wood pulp; cane sugar and coffee; wool, some 
chemicals, furs and hides ; fertilizers, oilseeds and vegetable oils; 
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burlap, diamonds, tin and tea. These represent outgoing pay. 
men ts. 
Since the value of the goods that we sold to foreigners exceeded 
those that we bought from them, the "balance of trade" gave 
rise to net incoming payments. The difference, $865,000,000, is 
therefore credited to the United States. How did foreign buyers 
in the aggregate pay us this trape balance T To answer this ques-
tion it is.necessary to consider the other items on the balance 
sheet. These will be taken up in the following order: Loans, in-
terest, tourist expenditures, immigrant remittances, miscella-
neous invisible items, and all others. 
Loans 
Two items in table I give capital movements. One of these 
covers investment transactions of Americans abroad and the 
other investments of foreigners in America. It is the difference 
behveen these two items that is of interest. In 1928 there was 
a net capital export of $718,000,000. This figure represents 
chiefly new investments of our citizens abroad. This made it 
possible for foreigners to buy more from us than they sold to us. 
A word of explanation, however, is necessary since the gross :fig-
ures of which this is the difference are so extremely large. The 
reason is that most of the transactions appearing in these items 
represent trading in bonds and stocks. The buying and selling 
of these securities not unlike the trading in the stock market, 
tend to cancel out. 
The events of the World War changed the United States from 
a debtor to a creditor nation. Nor did the change in our financial 
position stop there. Since then foreigners have become more 
and more indebted to us. Americans have invested increasing 
amounts in foreign securities. The economic consequences of 
this capital movement of the past two decades are both far-
reaching and profound. America is fast becoming a mature 
creditor country. It is the significance of this new role of the 
United States that so vitally affects the export farmer. It bears 
directly upon our tariff policy. Foreigners today must find dol-
lars to pay interest to us before they can buy our commodities. 
Interest 
The item giving the net earnings that Americans receive on 
their foreign investments is very important. For 1928 interest 
and dividend payments to our citizens from abroad netted the 
United States $537,000,000. The item not only is large but is 
increasing in lize. As interest and sinking fund payments are 
made each year upon old and new loans to f~reigners this item 
increases. It is these payments that are of paramount signifi-
cance to the American farmer. · 
Our earnings on investments abroad definitely compete with 
our exports of lard, wheat and cotton for dollar exchange. When 
dollars are virtually unobtainable abroad, as they are at present, 
TABLE II. BALA?WE OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1922·1931 
(Mllllona of Dollan) 
1922 
c ....... 1111e1 ta) 
4,121 r:i:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3,4JI 
~~~\:.!=.'~! .............. 702 
Rtturu 011 ~ lnTWtmonta •••••••••••••• 411 
Return on wart bt ••..• •.•••••••.•.•••••. JllS 
AU olhtr llrm1 (d) ........................ m 
()Gld (e:iporla) ............................ ... 
1,705 
o.tiebl• l'.,_.ta (•t •eWU) 
C.pital uporta .......................... 763 
Toutial ujiendllure. ........ , ............ , • 370 
lmm~nl remlllalleH.,, ...... , .......... 247 
M1- lanooaa lniilibLa lle1111 •• , •••••••••••• JOI 
AU olhn ilNlll (d) ........................ 
()Gld (lmporta) ........................... 2i4 
J,705 
(•) AdJualed for dlft'erenc11 In 711.r end I•~· 
(b) Prellmlna?J'. 
1023 
4,308 
4,J02 
20G 
4J4 
250 
OJ 
. .. 
970 
w 
218 
Jin 
m 
970 
JG24 1025 
4,834 11,177 
3,962 4,MI 
882 833 
443 400 
183 JBO 
UJ iOi . .. 
J,0411 l,38J 
733 aw 
uo 487 
219 227 
Ill 118 
iio 49 ... 
J,MO l,38J 
102$ lm 1~ 111211 11130 
ll,<M4 11,00J 11,333 11,447 4,005 
f,700 4,608 4,408 4,m 3,294 
m &83 8M G4S SOJ 
472 1111 1137 S65 010 
Jfl5 200 207 2f11 24J 
413 i&i m 02 ... ... . .. .. . 
1,3118 J,402 J,SSJ 1,482 J,OllS 
MO 69& 718 3Jfl 2115 
4811 MS Ml G8ll llM 
210 11111 2J8 223 lM 
47 
'2i 72 13$ JZJ 
'ii 213 i:iO 142 ... ... 2711 
1,3118 1,4112 J,881 J,482 J,058 
(c) Includ .. f218,000,000 of nel lnJlow of funds lnlo the United Stale• aa a tellult of lnternallonal 11eeurl17 tran1actlons. 
(d) L11r1el7 chancea In 1he lnJlow or ouUlow of 1hort ierm credit. 
JG3J 1G32(b) 
2,823 1,750 
2,254 J,430 
369 320 
7M(e) 
113 II 
i7o 
J,424 
458 .... 
163 
J52 
04J 
. .. II 
J,424 
Source: Bued on lhe 11udlea of Ra1 Hall, formerl7 aulalant chief of the Flnanee and Jnnatment Dlvl1lon, Department of Commerce, and of 
Amoa E. Ta7lori prl'lenl a1sl1laut chief, aa reported In TA• Balanc• o/ Jntwnalional .P11)'n11nl• of th• l!.Ultd Stat,. ,,. 1931, Trade 
lntormallon Bu letlu No. 803, and In CN11rllu publh:allon1. 
~ 
-:a 
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interest and principal payments come first and the produce of 
the export farmer goes begging for a market. 
Tourists and Immigrants 
So great was the annual migration of Americans in 1928 that 
it is estimated that $824,000,000 w.as spent by them abroad. This 
includes the money spent by our citizens living abroad who derive 
their income from this country. After subtracting the expendi-
ture of foreigners in America there remained $661,000,000. This 
item is an invisible import; it is principally a payment for serv-
ices rather than for goods. 
Immigrant remittance is also an outgoing payment made up 
largely of gifts and of debt payments from recently arrived 
immigrants to relatives and friends in the old country. Time, 
however, slowly loosens the tie that obligates the immigrant to 
his kin who remained behind; each yeaT sees a smaller number of 
dollars sent back to them. 
:Miscellaneous Invisible Trade 
Under the heading of miscellaneous invisible items are in-
cluded numerous invisible exports and imports. Freight pay-, 
ments and receipts, ocean-borne passenger traffic, United States 
government receipts and disbursements abroad, foreign repre-
sentations here, missionary and charitable contributions, motion 
picture royalties, Canadian electric power used in the United 
States, foreign subscriptions to American publications, patents, 
copyrights, royalties, legal fees, advertising, cablegrams, radio-
grams iµid international telephone servic~ll of these contrib-
ute to this catch-all item. In the aggregate the services in this 
group tend to cancel each other. The net figure that remains is 
small and is in favor of foreigners, therefore, a debit. 
Other Items 
The returns on war debts are about as large as immigrant re-
mittances. The annual payments are scheduled over the next 60 
years. They gradually increase until 1984 when $423,000,000 is 
scheduled. This item, although comparatively small, also com-
petes for the dollars that foreigners are able to get, hence it def-
initely tends to reduce our trade balance. 
Of all commodities, gold has a special privilege in foreign 
trade. It is exported and imported without any tarift' restriction. 
For instance, when the pressure of international payments is in 
our favor it is quickly and readily imported to balance the ac-
counts. It usually is a small item in the total international turn-
over of a country. Yet from the beginning of the World War 
until about 1925, there was an extraordinary movement of gold 
into the United States. It was the one way, outside of borrowing, 
that foreigners had of paying for their purchases. This move-
ment, of necessity, had to stop because the amount of gold in the 
world is after all limited. 
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Short term credits to foreigners are debts of foreigners to 
American banks. They are in the main temporary credit ac-· 
count.s-bills that have not been paid. 
The post-war international accounts of Uncle Sam show three 
important classes of credit transactions, namely, (1) exports 
in excess of imports,1 (2) earnings on investments abroad, and 
(3) returns on war debts. The cash book was balanced by three 
large items on the debit side; they were, (1) loans to foreigners, 
(2) tourist expenditures, and (3) immigrant remittances. 
Observe that American tourists and our immigrants trans-
ferred about enough dollars out of the United States to cover 
interest due us on investments abroad and the scheduled pay-
ments on the war debt. From 1922 to 1930 these four items prac-
tically canceled each other. 
An important characteristic of the interest and principal pay-
ments due American citizens is the fact that they are fixed by 
contract. Foreign individuals, corporations, municipalities and 
governments using American capital have contracted to pay each 
year a specified number of dollars to their bondholders. Except 
as there is default and repudiation the interest and amortization 
on the debts that foreigners owe us are fixed for years into the 
future regardless of how hard or how easy it is to obtain American 
dollars abroad. Observe also that the size of the net payments 
covering earnings on our investments abroad is gradually increas-
ing. Nor is its trend likely to change in the immediate future. 
Debtor-Creditor Position of the United States 
In 1914 investments of foreigners in United States securities 
stood at about 3,000 million dollars greater than similar in-
vestments of Americans in foreign securities. We know that 
many of our early railroads were largely built by European 
capital. This net debt of the United States gave Europe an 
annual income of around 200 million dollars. The payment of 
this interest produced dollars abroad, hence a good market for 
our exports. In spite of restrictions upon imports into this coun-
try we enjoyed before the war a profitable foreign m:arket. 
But all this has changed. By 1931 we held long term invest-
ments abroad including the war debt and Gi!rman obligations to 
the United States Government totaling 23,337 million dollars. 
On the other hand, foreign investments in the United States were 
estimated at 2,422 million dollars. Instead of being in a debtor 
position to the extent of 3,000 million dollars, the United States 
is today a creditor by around 20,915 million dollars or a net 
change of nearly 24,000 million dollars. 
The Great War along with .subseqU1nt events changed the 
United States from G position of the world'• greatest debtor to 
that of one of her two greatest creditors. 
thmod of the literature whl!D aporte aeeetl Imports a "fa-rorable ha1anee of 
tracte'' 11 ul4 to aid. Thl1 la often ml1leadlnc to the laJ' r..4er, who Is lllrelJ' to 
lnteTpret the word "fuorehle" u lmp!Jinr a dslrahle lltate of &train wb-. the term 
bu uo auch lmplleallan. 
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TABLE III. CHANGE IN THE LONG-TERM DEBTOR-CREDITOR POSITION 
OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1914 TO 1981. 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Amttican 
in""9tmenll 
abroad 
Foreign i""'9t-
menll in the 
United Slates 
19H. ... • . • • . .. .. • . . . • . . • .. • •. . . . . . . . . • . • • • . . . 2,350(a) li,3SO(b) 
1001................................... . . . . • . . 23,337(c) 2,422(d) 
Net chance in creditor position or the United 
Stales ................................................................. .. 
Net creditor 
l'OlitiOD or the 
United States 
-3,000 
20,915 
23,915 
Source: a. llld·polnt of estimate made by Ray Hall which appears In A.meft.:G Wri11ha 
Her Gold, by Jamee Harvey Rogers, 1981 r· 46. 
h • .Adjusted to eatimale of National Indnatria Conference Board, 7!h• lnler-
national Financial Po1Uion of th11 United State•, 1929. p. a. 
c. Includes 8 Items: (1) .American lnvestmenta ln foreign countries at the 
end of 1981 <•15,685,000,000) given In XA11 Balance o/ Inlernational Pa11· 
"'"'" of the Unit•d Statu in 1981 DepL of Commerce, Trade Inf. 
Bui. No. 803. Table 16, p, 44; (2) Vaine of War Debt, at 4~'!1.. June 80, 
1930 <•7,390IOOO\OOO). Rogera. op. cit. Table II, p. 47; and· (3) Value 
of German Ob lgauom to the United Statea Government, at 4~%. :March BO, 
1981 <•a12,ooo,ooo). Rogers, op. clL Table II, p. 47. 
d. Includes 2 Items: (1/ American lnvestmenta held bf foreigners. Xhe 
Balatw:• of ltUernaliona PavnM1nt1 of lhe Umled 8ta111 •n 1981. <•2,250,· 
000,000) op. clL, p. ~8 i and (2) Obligations to foreigners from nwarda 
by .Allen Property Cn1iocilan, Dec, 81, 1930 and War Claims .Arbiter June 
80, 1931. <•172,000,000). Rogera. op. cit. Table II, p. 4.7. 
It was pointed out above that at the .outbreak of hostility the 
net income from long term investments was around 200 million 
dollars in favor of foreigners holding Anierican securities. In 
contrast, in 1930, Americans received a net balance of 616 million 
dollars on long term investments abroad. 
The complete reversal of our country from a debtor to a credi-
tor nation; the paym~nt of more than a half a billion dollars net, 
principally interest, annually to us as creditors; a payment that 
is largely fixed by contract and one that is increasing each year 
in size-these are facts of supreme significance to the American 
exporters, foremost among whom are the hog, wheat and cotton 
farmers. 
·It is clearly evident that for the next 10 years and longer, more 
and more of the limited supply of dollars available to the outside 
world will be needed to pay back interest and principal of capital 
now invested abroad. With property rights as they are, the obli-
gations of the creditor come first. How, then, are foreign buyers 
to get dollars with which to purchase our farm produce, that 
surplus which in the past we sold to them at a satisfactory price f 
Obviously our invisible exports-tourist expenditures, immigrant 
remittances and other invisible items--eannot be expanded read-
ily to make available to foreigners sufficient dollar exchange with 
which to pay us a large trade balance. · 
Overnight as it were, the events of the World War changed 
this country from a debtor to a creditor nation. But our policies 
are as of old. We still expect to export without permitting equiv-
alent imports. 
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How Uncle Sam Has Been Trading 
Since the war Europe borrowed and we exported. They sent 
us long term bonds and we sent them bread and meat. Thus until 
recently we maintained our export trade in spite of the bald fact 
that foreigners were not able to earn enough dollars to pay for 
the commodities they bought from us. Up to 1930 net capital 
investments abroad practically covered our trade balance. 
But this merely postpones the day of reckoning. Like rolling 
a snowball, next year's bill has always been greater by accumu-
lated interest and amortization of the previous borrowings. But 
now 101111s to foreign nations have ceased and exports have de-
clined to a third of the 1925-1929 level. Observe the figures in 
table IV. 
Let us translate this state of affairs into private transactions. 
Imagine a shoemaker heavily in debt who for over a decade is 
not permitted to sell his wares, but who is forced to pay his living 
expenses, the interest on his mortgage, and in addition certain 
scheduled payments on a debt that he inherited, in the following 
ways: (1) by borrowing more and more money from his cred-
itors, (2) by turning his shop into a summer resort and (3) by 
using the few dollars his relatives in the country see fit to send 
him. What manner of business is this I Certainly it cannot go 
on indefinitely. Nor has it. Table IV shows what drastic 
changes had already occurred in our international balance of 
payments by 1931. 
The depression has stopped the outward flow of new American 
capital; in fact, the capital movement has for the time being re-
versed itself. In 1931 some foreigners were buying back some 
TABLE IV. COMPARISON OF THE BALANCE OP INTERNATIONAL PAY· 
llEZ.'TS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR Ul31WITHTHE11125·111211 AVERA.OE 
(llllllon1 ,,f Dollan) 
c..n-lillos (al 
e=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
~,=~~~ ............................  
t:::..::r~~::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::: 
All Olber cndill ......................................... . 
O.tbW p.,._u (..i fflilb) 
&~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:~~::~~ 
1925-1929 
Annce 
5,218 
~.1117 
Gill 
511 
200 
200 
'" Int 
21& 
1$7 
1931 
2.m 
2,254 
389 
7GG(e) 
113 
171 
0 
458 
163 
lm(d) 
1!132(b) 
1.no 
1,f30 
0 
(a) Aclfaated for dll'l'erence In 7ear end la,;. 
Cb) Prellmlnarr. 
(c) Include& •218,000,000 of nn follow of fonds Into the Unl!N Stata darlns 1931 
as J'ellalt of lnlttllatlonal aeearity tran11ct.lon1. 
(d) •765.000,000 of thl• llgure repretienlll a nirt oaUlow of 1bort term capital from 
· the United States. It relledl espttlall7 the aharp drop In depoalta carried in the 
American JDarkirt bJ' forelgnen. 
Source: Based on the stadiea of Ra7 Hall, fonattly anlstant chief of the Finance and 
lnTestment Dlrlaion, D~artmenL of Commette and of AmOI E. Ta7lor, prea· 
enL aaai1lant cblef1 aa reported In TAe Bal.4~e of lnUl'llallonat Pa11-..u •I 
th• VnU~4 Stalu tn 11111. Trade Information Bulletin No. 803. 
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of their bonds while others were liquidated, and as a result there 
was a net capital flow of $218,000,000 into the United States. 
Exports and imports dropped precipitously. In 1932 they 
were less than one-third of the 1925-1929 average. Fewer tour-
ists went abroad; their expenditures were $200,000,000 less in 
1931 than in the preceding year. The remittances made by immi-
grants also declined. 
The important changes which the depression has brought to 
our balance of international payments are: (1) a cessation of 
new American investments abroad, (2) a drastic decline in our 
trade balance, (3) increased earnings and collections on invest-
ments made to foreigners and (4) a sharp increase in short time 
credit extended to foreigners. The other items all declined. The 
returns on the war debt reflect the effect of the Hoover morator-
ium declared in June, 1931. 
The international accounts do balance. But tourist expendi-
tures, immigrant remittances and miscellaneous invisible im-
ports are not enough to cover the returns due the United States 
on foreign investments and war debts and at the same time leave 
foreigners with sufficient balance of dollars with which to buy 
tlie usual quantity of American commodities. For some years 
this deficit has been covered by loans to foreigners and by the 
importation of gold. Neither of these offers promise for the im-
mediate future. 
If foreigners are to buy American produce they must find it 
possible to sell their specialties in this country. If they cannot 
sell in our market they may borrow dollars with which to buy 
from us. Because they were able to borrow, foreign trade did 
appear to go on satisfactorily from 1924 to 1929. Borrowing, 
however, has stopped. How now are foreign countries to buy 
lard, wheat and cotton T They must first pay annually, in dollars, 
interest and dividends due Americans. This, too, can in the long 
run be done only in imports, visible and invisible. In substance, 
they must sell to us before they are able to buy from us. Again, 
we are back to the second principle underlying all international 
trade, namely, imports are the demand for our exports because 
imports pay for exp<>rls. The two go hand in hand. 
To see how tariffs work one has to stand above individual sched-
ules and look at the picture as a whole. It is not easy for a farmer 
or businessman to do this. For one reason, he is likely to con-
sider only those tariffs on the things he produces thus missing 
their national and international effects. Then, too, international 
trade, including the tariff problem, is always very complex. 
The interrelations of one group of farmers to another, of agri-
culture to industry, and of the United States to the rest of the 
world are intricate questions; yet, they all have to be taken into 
account. 
Economic Consequences 
It is the general picture of foreign trade that has been stressed 
in this study. We have looked into the international records and 
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accounts of Uncle Sam and we have analyzed the yearly state-
ments of incoming and outgoing payments. The most important 
single fact that has come to our attention is our complete change 
from a debtor to a creditor country. Moreover we found that 
our creditor position has amazingly expanded. 
The economic consequences of this change in the financial posi-
tion of the United States are not generally understood. It is a 
new experience for America. As a nation we are still debtor-
minded. We think and act like debtors; our policies are those 
that suited the pre-war period; we do not know what it means to 
be creditors. It has taken a crisis to awaken us. 
The export farmer is, of course, vitally af?ected. His very 
existence is at stake. But he is not alone. The interdependence 
between hog and dairy farmers and between farm and city 
people is fairly evident today. They are all tied together. When 
one falls off the precipice the others follow or absorb the shock 
and rescue the victim. ' 
When foreign markets for cotton, wheat, lard and tobacco dis-
appear it is only a matter of time until the prices of butter, beef, 
mutton and eggs are dragged down. American farming is still 
dominated by the export group. They set the tempo of our agri-
cultural well-being. Nor is the city outside the pale of its inftu-
ence. Witness the consequences of the Jack of purchasing power 
among farm people; it has seriously affected the rest of our busi-
ness. community. The fact that farmers are unable to buy is 
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being keenly felt in our industrial centers. Factories are forced 
to close and the ranks of the unemployed are increasing because 
of the inability of farmers to buy their products. Tlte loss of th.6 
foreign markets has destroyed the fundamental balance of our 
national economic Zif e. 
The present crisis in international trade has brought wide.-
spread disaster to the export farmer. Figure 2 shows how much 
harder he is hit than the farmer not directly dependent upon for-
eign ·outlets. The export group is today receiving prices only 
about one-half as high as the non-export group, who, too, are 
definitely depressed. The weighted average farm price in De-
cember of the commodities on an export basis was 43 percent of 
pre-war; whereas, the non-export group stood at 80 percent of 
the 1910-1914 price level. This looks like an excellent argument 
for getting all of our agriculture on a domestic basis. Certainly, 
the home market is more certain, and dependable in periods such 
as we are now in. 
But the American farmers, especially those of the Mississippi 
Valley, are inescapably dependent upon foreign buying. The 
home market, in spite of the phenomenal growth of our cities, 
cannot absorb anywhere near all of the food and raw materials 
of our farms. Moreover, there is not even a remote probability 
that any possible increase in our industrial population will pro-
vide during the next decade or two a home market sufficiently 
large. Facts force us to accept the conclusion, whether we wish 
it or not, that farmers must continue to sell abroad or face whole-
sale liquidation. Temporarily, production may, of course, be 
checked and even reduced to something approaching a domestic 
basis. But as a five or ten-year policy it is extremely problemati-
cal. Observe the following figures. The crop and animal prod-
ucts of nearly one-fifth of our crop land were annually exported 
from J922 to 1928. How low must prices fall and how long 
must they stay down before this 20 percent of our farm land is 
shifted or taken out of farm use! 
TABLE V. CROP LAND REQUIRED TO PRODUCE AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS THAT COULD BE PRO· 
DUCED IN THE UNITED STATES 
Acricultmal ~ (a) ••••••••••••• ••.••· .. •••••••• ... ·•............ 11$,000.000 ~~::~.~~~~-~~~-~~~~.~~:~~-~~~~:::::: Jg;:l:i::=l 
Pment 
of total 
18.6 
4.3 
100. 
(a) 'l'bls Is the &Tea u11ed for the production of crop and animal products esported '' 
estimated for 1922·1928 (55!000,000 acrea) pla1 the area required to produce 
feed for the work lllock used n producing oar exported produces. (b) Obviously It Is noi adTantageoua to undertake the commercial production of all 
the agrlcaltaral commodities Imported, for Instance, 1ueh tropical products as 
bananas, pineapples, colree and rubber. 'l'bl1 tlga111 11 the area of land that would 
he required to produce thoae commodities that are capable of 'bt!lnc produced In 
thl1 country at coses that an not exceasiYe. 
Source: L. 0. Gray and O. E. Baker. Land Utitlzation and the Fann Problem, ?disc. 
Publication No. 97, Department of Agriculture, 1930. 
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ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
The foregoing analysis of our balance of international pay-
ments points to several alternative courses of action. In sim1>lest 
terms they are: 
1. Resume loaning capital funds to foreigners. 
2. Decrease exports. 
3. Increase imports. 
Without attempting, at this point, to weight the advantages 
and disadvantages of a tariff policy, these three possibilities, or 
a combination thereof, are open to us. At present, knowingly 
or otherwise, the United States is carrying out a policy the con-
sequences of which can be none other than to decrease exports. 
Throughout this study no mention has been made of the 
adverse effects of foreign tariffs, import quotas, milling restric-
tions, import monqpolies and exchange control upon our foreign 
trade. All of these are bearing heavily on the export farmer, 
particularly since most of the trade restrictions enacted in the 
last three years have been on agricultural commodities. The 
removal of these severe restrictions would certainly ease the pres-
sure against our wheat and lard and other farm products. But 
the fact remains, even though every foreign country \\'ere to 
remove all of its trade barriers, our export trade would still be 
doomed, unless foreign countries can sell in our market. Cotton, 
for example, has no tariffs against it abroad, and yet it, too, finds 
the foreign market without dollars with which to buy cotton. 
For the next few years there is little likelihood that much 
money will be loaned to foreigners. The revival of our commod-
ity exports by resuming our policy of loaning money is not \'cry 
promising. Too many of our citizens, who hold foreign bonds 
have taken unexpected losses. This is going to make it hard for 
some time to float foreign securities in .America. In fact, as was 
indicated earlier, the capital movement, for tbe time being, has 
reversed itself. Some American inve.<Jtors are trying to return 
their capital to the United States. Inst.cad of ptomotinir our 
export trade, this action further stifles it. 
The scaling down of foreign loans now in force, both prh·ate 
and public, would tend to relieve the pressure on dollars now 
required for incoming payments for interest and sinking funds. 
Such a creditor-debtor adjustment would help commoditv sales 
abroad. It is not amis.<J to point out that t.he war debt is hut a 
small part of our total creditor holdings. The outlook for relief 
to the export farmer from more loans to foreigners and from a 
scnlinsr down of pre.'lent investments of .Americans abroad is cer-
tainly doubtful. 
Another alternative is to rleerense export!!. This mranic ncljust-
inir production more nearly to a c1orne.<1tic bnsis. It im·oh-r.'J 
shrinkinJt the export industries to the point where import'I, vis-
ible and invisible, will pay for our ean1ings on foreign in\·cst-
ments, returns on the war debt and, if a balance remains. for ex-
ports. Presumably, the 11hrinking process i11 automatic. Becamie 
foreiJ?ll bnyer11 are unable to get clollan tn huv our eommoditieR 
. ~ . ' 
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the price of these commodities therefore falls to a point so low 
that a sufficient number of producers are forced out of these fields. 
Thus a new equilibrium would be created. It is needless to say 
that an adjustment of this kind in agriculture is extremely slo'v 
ancl socially very painful. Dislocations in agriculture require 
years to mend themselves. · 
The third alternative involves increasing imports. The im-
portant factor in such a policy would be the scaling down of our 
tariff wall. This does not necessarily mean free trade or an 
abandonment of protection. Such a 'policy calls for "enough of 
an increase in imports of diversified manufacturers to make it 
unnecessary for us to base our export trade on foreign loans." 
Lowering the tariff wall would force some tariff protected in-
dustries to shift to those business activities that can compete with-
out prohibitive tariffs. 
The choice is unmistakably between the second and third of 
these alternatives. As a nation we must either decrease our ex-
ports or increase our imports. One represents the ·demand for 
the other. The two must balance. 
Thus far it has not been our expressed purpose to show which 
of these two alternatives is the better national policy. Our task 
has been to consider the consequences of our past policy. Their 
effects upon the export farmer have been pointed out. We have 
not, however, appraised the advantages of tariffs from a national 
viewpoint. . That job remains. 
Tariffs are intended to check imports. It is the protective 
aspect and not the revenue-raising feature of tariffs that is com-
monly stressed in Congress. What reasons are there for a nation 
to check, in fact, often prohibit, imports Y There are many argu-
ments advanced for tariffs. The more important of these will be 
examined in a later circular of this series. 
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